An assortment of my philosophical ponderings.

 
[NB: The below posts are quite old.]
posted by onceuponapriori at 4:07 م

 
Ayn Rand 'bridges' the gap between is and ought by denying that such a gap exists. This is a necessary step in her constructing a foundation for objectivist ethics. She proceeds (approximately) thusly:

1. If X's nature is Y, then X ought to strive to be Y.
1a. (If Man's nature is 'rational animal' then Man ought to be a 'rational animal').
2. X is Y.
2a. (Man's nature is 'rational animal').
3. Ergo, X ought to strive to be Y.
3a. (Ergo, Man ought to strive to be a 'rational animal').

The argument appears valid, but are the premises true? I'd like to present a possible counterexample:

Suppose X is a man and further suppose that 3a is true.

Suppose still further that technology is developed which allows X to shed his animal nature; perhaps, he is given the opportunity of having his brain placed in a mechanical body (most would hardly call this animal, but hey maybe so). This body would allow him to live indefinitely and thus to continue to pursue and preserve all that he values. Rand's argument would have all of her followers die.

Also, don't animals, by their nature, die, but posses a will to survive? Is it not also within the nature of an animal to live at all costs? Is the "survival modifier" stronger than the "rational modifier". When a situation arises in which elements of some entity's nature are in opposition, one would think that one of the elements would need to supercede the others. Certainly, there are situations where 'rational' and 'will to survive' would clash (eg, a boy who is starving to death and needs to steal food -- yes, he has begged and tried everything else).

But really, we need to discover whether premise 1 is true. I don't remember her spending much time defending it, but I will investigate it. As someone else -- A Fyfe -- pointed out, it almost seems as if Rand is attempting here to define ethics into existence.
posted by onceuponapriori at 3:34 م

 
Do we have a "sensus moralis" (SM)? Could not such a sense be publically testable; eg: Paul sees a murder and explains it to Peter. Both agree that it was wrong. Could this silence the ardent empiricists (by preventing them special-pleading with regards to the "five senses") and also the objectivists? Or is this just "inter-subjectivity?" But even if it is, does the SM provide for objective identification of moral principles?

Is the SM a gift from God, or the result of an evolutionary process? Is it in a symbiotic relationship along with intuition and reason, or is it intuition? What steps might we take to find out? Would a SM act most regularly as a survival mechanism, or is it more likely a moral mechanism (teleologically)? What constitutes a survival gene?

Walking a straight line requires at least three processes: two conscious - the use of muscles to move and reason to identify the line -- and one unconscious -- the body's natural balancing mechanisms. Is the identification of a moral truth similar? Perhaps, the SM identifies or presents the most basic moral truth to our consciousness unconsciously, and we then consciouslly reason to identify particular instances to which the moral principle applies. Eg, SM tells us justice (ie, the abstract) is a virtue, while our Reason tells us that stabbing a man for mere personal enjoyment (ie, the particular) is wrong.

...and so it goes...
posted by onceuponapriori at 3:45 ص

 
Here is a rough argument in support of premise 5 in the Argument from Volition:

1. "Determinism" =def "the belief that all events are entirely determined by antecedent causes"
2. Within a naturalistic framework, human beliefs are mere phyiscal events.
3. If determinism is true, then all human beliefs are entirely determined by antecedant causes.
4. "Knowledge" =def "a justified true belief".
5. No belief which is entirely causally determined by events beyond the agent could epistemically justified.
6. But, if a belief cannot be justified, then it cannot become knowledge.
7. If determinism is true, then we cannot have knowledge.
8. We have knowledge.
9. Ergo, determinism is false.

Indeed, even the claim that determinism is true is a claim to knowledge. So, if determinism invalidates knowledge, it also stultifies any claim that it is true. Perhaps a reductio ad absurdum would be better here?

Obviously, 5 is the tough one. But if one cannot test their beliefs and then make a decision based upon that test and or deliberation surrounding it and other evidence, can one really claim to be justified? No. But what if our senses "cause" justification in some way, rather than just belief....oh well...thinking time.

Email me if your interested in discussing this.
posted by onceuponapriori at 4:47 م

 
If anyone happens upon this lonely page and sees this, let me know what you think about it. Just do me the favor of remembering that it is in very rough form (much like the rest of this "article" ;) )

The argument from volition (rough form)

1. Volition is inconsistent with Determinism.
2. Naturalism entails Deteriminism.
3. Therefore, one must abandon belief in either Naturalism or Volition.
4. Naturalism is based upon inconclusive evidence.
5. Volition is axiomatic.
6. Therefore, one must abandon belief in Naturalism.

Obviously, the whole thing needs quite a bit of work. Every premise must be argued for.

1. I'd need to define volition such that it does not comply with compatabilistic leanings. Contra-causal free will, or whatever. I'd need to make sure that Volition retains its meaning in (5). Hopefully this won't be too hard.

2. This should be based upon the laws of causality and the impossibility of breaking the causal chain. Perhaps materialism would be a more precise term to use here, but I am not too familiar with all of the distinctions. The idea is, basically, that, if our minds are really just our physical brains, they are subject to antecedent conditioning just as is any other physical process. Obviously, this entailment is not a narrow, logical entailment. I'd need to cite some scientific documentation, here.

3. A rational mind cannot hold to two inconsistent propositions.

4. I could even grant that Naturalism's probability is approaching 99.9999999999999999999. Since axioms are necessarily held to with total certainity, Volition's probability will always supercede Naturalism's.

5. This has been established by Rand and some of her followers in detail. I need to understand it completely. The problem is, I believe it necessarily entails a particular epistemology, which would have to be argued for if this premise is to be established as true. This might require a book long volume, or a sentence - I'm not sure.

6. This should be obvious, but it does presuppose that one should base their beliefs on the epistemic probability of their truth. I don't think many people would have difficulty affirming this...
posted by onceuponapriori at 5:21 م

 
On [My Quick Summary Of] Epistemology

An inquiry into epistemology typically asks at least these two fundemental questions:

1. What does it mean to know something?
2. How can we know something?

1. To know something, is to justifiably believe that that something is the case, while that something really is the case. In other words, for P to know X, it must be the case that (i) P believes that X is true, (ii) X is true and (iii) P has a sufficient reason to believe that X is true. I have heard that this viewpoint is often referred to as the 'JTB', or 'Justified True Belief' theory of knowledge.

Inevitably, one might now inquire as to what it means for 'X to be true'. X is true iff. it is the case that X. This is commonly referred to as the 'correspondence theory of truth', wherein, eg, 'snow is white' if and only if it actually is the case that snow is white.

2. How does one (properly) arrive at knowledge regarding a particular proposition? As discussed, they must have some reason to believe that which they believe. There are several different methods of obtaining justificaiton in one's belief about a proposition which correspond to different classifications of propositions. Some of these categories are:

i) Axioms. These propositions are accepted as the foundations for the remainder of one's knowledge base. There are at least two types of axioms with which I am concerned:

a. Self-Validating. These axioms are the type which cannot be denied by any consistent, rational being. Their very denial neccessitates their usage. Some (undetailed) examples are:

aa. A is A; A is not non-A.
ab. Humans are capable of knowing.
ac. Communication can be meaningful and coherent.
ad. I (the speaker) exist.
ae. The senses can provide valid data to the mind.

b. Ad Hoc. These are axioms which are usually posited (only) in an attempt to validate some other belief that a person already holds. These axioms are not self-validating in that they can be consistently denied by a rational human being. 'Blind faith'-type statements
probably fall into this category. Some examples are:

ba. My first intuition regarding a proposition is always correct.
bb. There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet.
bc. The Bible Alone is the Word of God.

ii) Empirical Statements. These propositions are the result of experiencing the world and making general assessments regarding that experience, keeping one's axioms in mind. They are held provisionally, and are often (and should be) the result of logically (and intuitively) choosing the best method to explain the several relevant facts of experience. Each empirical statement should be held with as much certainity as is possible given the strength of the evidence. Some examples are:

a. Probably, all swans are white.
b. Probably, there is at least one object of which I am unaware.
c. Probably, there are less Italians in the US then non-Italians.
d. Probably, there are other minds.

iii) Analytical Statements. These are statements that are true as a result of the combined meanings of the words of those statements, ie, when the predicate reveals only information identical to that found in the subject. For instance, "All bachelors are unmarried". These can be held as certainly true, but are (mostly) trivial in nature.

iv) 'Self-reports' (thanks steve conifer). Other types of statements can be held as certainly true. For instance, "I am experiencing pain." Whether or not I am delusioned, my *experience* is still such that I am in pain. (I am thinking that statements such as these *may* be just complicated examples of Analytical Statements, depending on how one views the self and its properties and the word 'I'. Suppose that 'I' refers to the speaker and all of his properties. One of the properties of 'I' is 'is experiencing pain'.)

A quick summary:

My epistemology is based upon the several pieces of knowledge entailed by self-validating axioms. Based upon these, I proceed to interpret the facts of experience in such a way as to arrive at the best possible explanation regarding those facts. I frequently dismiss 'arbitrary'/'ad hoc axiomatic'/'unsupported'/'blind faith' statements as not worthy for consideration.
posted by onceuponapriori at 2:27 م

 
A strong starting premise for several Cosmological Arguments is:

P. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

Recently, some people I have spoken to regarding cosmological arguments have attemted to deny this premise. (P) seems to be self-evidently true, but I will provide two rough arguments in support of it, one of them inductive and the other deductive.

Ind.:

1. We have observed many objects (Os) that begin to exist.
2. Each one of (Os) seems to have a sufficient cause.
3. Therefore, probably, all objects that begin to exist have a sufficient cause.

Ded.:

1. Something that begins to exist must either come from something or nothing.
2. But no thing can come from nothing.
3. Therefore, something that begins to exist must come from something.

If you find (Ded.2) controversial, I need only mention that 'nothing' has NO properties; it is literally NO THING. If nothing were to be the cause of something, then it need possess at least one property - 'is able to cause things'. Unfortunately, nothing cannot have such a property, or it would be something, not nothing.

Of course, the deductive argument is stronger (always save the best for last). As a side note, Ded1 can be more formally and powerfully stated as such:

Ded.1'. For any object X, if X begins to exist, X either comes from something, or else X comes from nothing.

...ex nihilo, nihilo fit
posted by onceuponapriori at 12:20 م

 
On Objectivism's Peculiar Possibility

Several objectivists that I have spoken to consider that, for a proposition (P) to be possible, it must meet the following criteria:

1. P must not be contrary to known fact.
2. There must be some evidence in favor of P.

Now, let us consider the proposition (P): 'John is a fireman.'

Imagine that we only know one fact concerning John, that he is 30 years old. Does P remain a possibility from the Objectivist's viewpoint? It seems not, for there is no evidence in favor of P. P is certainly not contrary to known fact, but it is dismissed as 'arbitrary' because (2) does not obtain.

Obviously, given our knowledge of John, it is possible that P. This portion of Objectivism obviously needs to be examined, keeping what we know about the concept 'possible' in mind. It may be that Objectivists reject modal logic, and take this position to remain consistent. I will report on this in the future.
posted by onceuponapriori at 3:27 م

 
To assert that 'any object (O) is not bound by logic' (P1) is to render that proposition, and every following proposition regarding O utterly meaningless. For if O is not bound by logic, it is necessary that any assertion referencing it is subject to the ravages of contradiction. P1 and its negation could be true simultaneously, and in the same sense - rendering P1 possibly false even if it is accepted as certainly true.

One cannot communicate nor conceive of an entity not bound by logic, as it renders the entity absurd... ex falso quodlibet.
posted by onceuponapriori at 12:01 ص

 
Consider the following three sets:

1. A set, Dog-L, containing an infinite number of Chocalate Labs.
2. A set, Dog-P, containing an infinite number of French Poodles.
3. A set, Dog containing both all of the objects in sets, '1' and '2'.

Does set 3 have more total members than either of set '1' or '2' alone? If you remove half of the objects in set '3', does it have the same number of objects as either of set '1' or set '2'? Once you've removed half of the objects in set '3', is it still the same size?

x = x * .5 ?

Once again, the concept of infinity reveals its incoherent nature. The only way to reproduce these results would be to substitute zero for infinity, above.
posted by onceuponapriori at 6:23 م

 
Is the fact that P possesses each of its properties a property of P? Wouldn't that, then, become a Pn+1, leading to infinite properties of P, thus making it impossible to enumerate every property that P possesses? (As an aside, consider the fact that the statement "P contains all of P's properties" is a tautology.)

P0 = P is red.
P1 = P is round.
...
Pn = P is heavy.
Pn+1 = P contains (P0,P1,Pn)
Pn+2 = P contains (P0,P1,Pn,Pn+1)
Pn+3 = P contains (P0,P1,Pn,Pn+1,Pn+2)
...
Pn+n = P contains (P0,P1,Pn,Pn+1,Pn+2,Pn+(n-1))

I'm thinking this is a grammatical mishap, rather than a conceptual flaw...
posted by onceuponapriori at 5:40 م

 
On Luck...

One of the purposes of philosophy is to examine the common claims made by men. One of these claims fits the form:

"Paul(P) is lucky."

I believe that, for the statement to have any meaning, it should be interpreted as such:

"Up until now, the events that occured have happened to turn out in P's favor, at least as far as we can tell."

Even reading it in this form yields only trivial information. This information could possibly be used to predict certain currently existing properties of P, but not to predict any of the future properties of P. There is no rational reason to assume that, as a result of P's past experiences, P's future experiences that are causally unrelated should end up yielding similar results.
posted by onceuponapriori at 2:42 م

 
Concerning the logical impossibility of time not beginning...

This is the time line posited by a naturalist who assumes that time, in this universe, has no beginning:

<---------nA---------------------nB---nC-nNow

Now, the point nC was the instant before you read this. Notice that, as a result of the line continuing infinitely backwards, the time between the 'start' of the line and nC is already infinite and then, AFTER an infinite amount of time has passed, we arrive in the present (nNow). That is obviously illogical and contradictory; an infinite amount of time could not have already passed.

I noticed that my original timeline, below, was not as clear as it should be (thanks Rafael).
posted by onceuponapriori at 2:24 م

 
A name is only meaningful if the person trying to understand it is familiar with the referent it describes. Consider that you do not know Paul (P):

1. My friend P came over last night.
2. My friend came over last night.

The sentence retains its full meaning with the omission of P.
posted by onceuponapriori at 1:33 م

 
On truth and speaking....

Each sentence (p) to be uttered in debate must be mutable to fit the form: It is true that 'p'. If a sentence does not retain its meaning in this form, it is not really claiming anything and should be considered subjective and trivial at best. Consider: It is true that 'there is no truth'.
posted by onceuponapriori at 11:04 ص

 
On the possiblity of some physical element having no beginning.If a physical element has no beginning, it has always existed (i.e. an infinite amount of time has passed while it has been in existence). Consider the following timeline, where n is any measure of time, and the numbers corresponding to n are the number of n's that have passed, with 'I' representing infinity:

n0---n1---n2---n3---nI---nNOW

Please note that at any point on this timeline, an infinite amount of time has *already* passed, but we'll concentrate on the jump from nI to NOW (the present). IF an infinite amount of time has passed before the instant you are reading this, how could you be reading this? The present would never arrive!

The purpose of this elementary explanation is to debunk the concept that some matter existed 'always', the argument that is necessary for the Big Bang to be true. The universe must have begun, else, there would be no present.
posted by onceuponapriori at 11:21 ص

 
On the Omnipotence of God....

Often I come across the ages-old argument against omnipotence: if God was omnipotent, he could create a rock that would be too large for him to move, thus rendering him not-omnipotent. This argument is flawed in that it is guilty of equivocation; omnipotence, in this context, refers to the ability to achieve anything this *is possible*. Assuming this is true, it prevents any omnipotent entity from acting in an impossible manner: creating a square circle, creating another entity more powerful then itself, et al.

Thus, God is all powerful in that he can do *anything* that does not cause a concept to become contradictory. Granted, this is an oversimplification, but I'll expound on it later...
posted by onceuponapriori at 10:48 ص

 
On the neccesary implications of the supernatural to avoid infinite regress in the causal chain:

"Why can you not accept that something may not have a reason to exist...I am constantly told by christians that...all the matter of the universe had to be made, yet god did not"

Few will claim that each entity must have a *reason* (i.e. purpose); the claim is that each entity must have a *cause*. This is a simple application of the Law of Causality; that each effect is necessarily preceded by a cause. This law is a scientific law which can be derived both from empirical and a priori observations; it is not a religous construct.

By accepting the law outlined above, one must conclude that there was some 'first' cause which is found *outside* the natural and physical causal chain (i.e. a *supernatural* cause). This 'unmoved mover', to a theist, is God, and I've yet to see a more reasonable assertion.
posted by onceuponapriori at 3:04 م

 
On Objectivist morality and the use of force...

"I would like to know why Objectivists think using force is immoral."

To answer such a question, one must give at least a cursory examination of the metaphysical nature of Man. Human beings, unlike plants and even lesser animals, have a conceptually oriented rational faculty that they *must* use to survive. Whereas a plant does not think, and a lesser animal acts instictually, a man must command nature (whilst obeying it) if he desires to live. Force is the only way one man can completely *prevent* another man from using his rational faculty as a means of survival.

"I would also like to know why Objectivists think morals are absolute"

Life is the standard of value, as all value stems from life. Thus, as morals are the standard by which man lives to create and preserve value, man's life is the standard of morals. That which destroys life is immoral; that which creates or preserves human life, is moral. These principles are observed from and grounded in reality, and thus are absolute and non-contradictory. A is A; A is not non-A.

The primary virtue of Objectivism is Reason as Reason is the means of man's survival. Any action or process which is anti-reason (i.e. evasion, contradiction, force) is immoral, but is not necessarily a violation of rights. Only the initiation of force can violate another man's rights.

"and I would like to know why violating another person's rights is immoral."

Violating another person's rights is necessarily immoral, as rights are *moral* principles sanctioning a man's freedom to act in a social context. The only way a man can violate another man's rights is by initiating force. This brings us back to your first question, as to why force is immoral.

"Do human rights have existence?"

Yes, in a social context.
posted by onceuponapriori at 10:48 ص

 
The letter that I sent to the Department of Justice in support of MicroSoft can be found here. Assuming that it might not be archived on that site indefinetly, I've also included the text here:

posted by onceuponapriori at 10:00 ص

 
On Thoughts...

Assuming that each existent is physical, and that we do, indeed, 'think', we *must* make the correlation that thoughts are based in the physical realm.

When you look at a firetruck, you can properly refer to it as 'red' even though there is nothing 'red' about the firetruck (it is a pattern of reflecting light-waves). In this context, however, red is a useful and true descriptor of the firetruck; you are making an abstraction of certain physical phenomona and neatly packaging them all into one little useful bundle: red.

What do we know of thoughts? Perhaps not enough, but, following the Objectivist understanding of reality, we *must* accept that each concept is an abstraction of reality (i.e. just like 'red'). In this case, thoughts are the conceptual abstractions associated with the chemical balances and electrical impulses of the physical brain. As with any other concept, you remove the 'degree' of measurement, so, each thought must have some content (a certain arrangement of neurons, etc.?), but can have any particular contents. Thus your thoughts are real, but only to the degree that they are abstractions of physical reality.

I'm not sure if any of that made sense, but perhaps its a start.
posted by onceuponapriori at 10:48 ص

 
This is a portion of a discussion on causality and freedom I am having at the capitalism magazine forum. You might want to look there for the full context of the discussion. Critiques are welcome.

"Your rebuttle, quoted above, is akin to the argument of fatalism, that thoughts and actions are determined by outside forces, that human consciousness is passive and reactionary. If this is the case, what is the first cause?"

Please clearly state what you are implying by questioning what a 'first cause' would be? Are you denying that each effect is proceeded by a cause? When the other posters are referring to the Law of Causality, they are not referring to the true (according to Rand) definition. It would do this discussion much good to understand how they are defining the Law of Causality:

Each cause has a resultant effect; each effect has a preceding cause.

Perhaps it would help to refer to it as the LOCb.

You properly defines axiom as "...a self-evident collolary, which, in trying to deny, you use." and then ignore the implications and definition that you stated (this may have been first stated by Tarin, if you disagree with the definition, please say why). The use of the concept 'axiom' must be strictly defined and only carefully used; else, everything becomes 'self-evident!' and 'axiomatic'.

"In attempting to deny free will, you will note that disagreement is possible. Since disagreement is possible, it shows that people have choice."

This does *not* necessarily prove the existence of Free Will. This simply means that something that *feels* like a 'choice' is possible; there is little or no sensory evidence to prove that some'thing' is occuring outside the causal chain (as described by the LOCb). I specifically state 'outside' because IF each effect has a *physical* (i.e. not spiritual i.e. not mystical i.e. *real*) cause, this extends to the machinations of consciousness.

"The very fact that I disagree with you shows that we have differing opinions which CAN change once one is convinced of the other's arguments. I am sure that you have noted this in your lifetime and can thus induce this on your own."

The fact that people's opinions can change says nothing about *how* they change. Is it Free Will? Perhaps, but this is certainly not *evidence*.

"Of course, your next question might be: what if we were preprogrammed to disagree? If everyone were pre-programmed in their opinions, then their opinions would never change."

This deduction is certainly not axiomatic. No one is claiming that some Greater Entity is programming the minds of men and preventing them from agreeing or disagreeing; the argument is that each thought that enters a man's mind is based upon some physical cause - a perception (causal behavior based on the identity of our perceptual organs) or an act of integration (causal behavior based upon the physical makeup of our brains). Thus, even the supposed primary choice, 'to focus or not' is determined by prior perceptions and thoughts.

"If opinions can change, what can explain this? Free will."

Chemical and electrical (i.e. physical) changes in the brain.

"To summarize, by denying axioms and engaging in this argument, you implicitly acknowledge disagreement and the possibility of convincing the other party to your point of view, which is possible only if free will exists whereby you and I can both choose what we believe in. "

You have yet to prove the axiomatic nature of Free Will. Simply referring to it as axiomatic does not suffice. You must prove it; unlike true axioms, proof does not presuppose free will. You must exist to argue, you must have consciousness (a faculty of identification and integration) to argue, but the same logic does not necessitate Free Will to argue. For instance, a computer *can* be programmed to 'disagree' until a certain condition is met; the same argument can be made for a man - that the physical condition (i.e. the integrated whole of all of the man's knowledge and prior experience) of the brain controls one's propensity to agree with a particular argument. (cont...)

"Do you believe in free will or not?"

This question was not directed at me, but I'll answer it 'for the record'. I *want* to believe in free will, and I *expect* to find some evidence or answer to my quandary, but I've yet to be convinced by any of the arguments I've yet been exposed to (including Peikoff's in OPAR). However, it may be possible that I am simply 'missing' some itegral part (i.e. that I have not 'thought it out properly'). I have not *rejected* the concept of Free Will, I've simply yet to be convinced of it *as we define it*.

"if...it were true that thoughts are determined by external stimuli, with no intervention by free will (as you state clearly above), and if thoughts determine actions, then NO ONE would be held accountable for ANYTHING...Just imagine the consequences."

This says *nothing* concerning the reality of Free Will, you are simply stating things how you'd *like* them to be, not necessarily as they *are*. This is the equivalent of a man in the 400 AD stating, "But if Celsus is correct, where will men get their morality?".
posted by onceuponapriori at 11:35 م

 
"Let’s say I see a boulder in the distance. It’s a boulder, right? But on closer inspection it turns out be made out of paper mache. Is it a boulder, a bundle of paper mache shaped like a boulder, or should the definition be a stage prop, perhaps? "

Again, a mistake in the identification process does not alter the underlying identity of the object. It was, in *fact*, a paper mache prop. Nothing more, nothing less. It would be an arbitrary assertion to state that the object was a boulder until closer inspection. You might even convince yourself and others that you are correct, but if you tried to hide behind it to avoid gunfire, you'd see just how objective reality is...

posted by onceuponapriori at 2:50 م

 
Statements fall into three categories: true, false, arbitrary. Consider again the identity of a painted, metal wall, and three statements pertaining to it:

1. That wall has paint on it. (this can be objectively proven; it conforms to reality, it is true.).
2. That wall does not have paint on it (this can be objectively disproven; it is contradictory to reality, it is false)
3. That metal from that wall is not worth much to me. (this cannot be objectively proven, it might conform to reality, it is arbitrary)

posted by onceuponapriori at 2:49 م

 
Concerning Objective Reality...

Reality is objective. Existence exists, existence is (identity) an entity, entities have identity, consciousness (*identification* and integration) presupposes identity...

We identify entities and their attributes with our senses, which are based on causal behaviours that are inexorably linked to the (absolute, non-cantradictory, existential) identity of each entity involved (retina,receptors, et al). Of course, this is an a priori exercise; our senses are the foundation of all proof (i.e. the foundation of our concepts) and thus their validity *must* be accepted to engage in *any* discussion (including discussions about them). To deny us our senses, is to renounce that denial as arbitrary; such claims *must* be dismissed out of hand by *rational* human beings...

An example of this?

The act of disagreeing upon aspects of reality *cannot* alter the identity of reality. Consider the following case:

Three men are brought into a room (Tom, Dick, and Harry) which has 3 curtains (1,2,3). Behind one of the curtains (2) lies a cash prize. The moderator of the exercise approaches each man, and explains to them the situation concerning the cash. Now, he approaches Tom and whispers, "Tom, if you split the cash prize with me, I'll tell you which curtain it's behind." When Tom agrees, the moderator *lies* and tells him the cash is behind curtain 1. He then approaches Dick, and tells him the *truth* (i.e. 'a statement that conforms to reality'), that the cash is behind curtain 2. Finally, the moderator approaches Harry, making a similar deal, and *deceptively* states that the cash is behind curtain number 3. He asks each man to write down his name and the number of the curtain he wishes to reveal.

Now, the 'primacy of consciousness' school would suggest that each man's answer is correct (true). This claim, as we know, is contradictory, and while each man may be acting *honestly*, he is not providing a *true* statement. It doesn't matter how much each man *wishes* or *believes* that the cash is behind each curtain; the only thing that matters is where the cash *actually is*.

Imagine the dismay as Tom and Harry so *honestly* give their predictions, and they are shown to be incorrect (*un-true*), constrasted to the jubilation (though anti-climatic) claims of Dick - who was expecting to win anyways.

As you can see, the "conflicting ideologies, theories and concepts" had *no bearing whatsoever* on the actual outcome of the game. This is the difference between the theories of objective reality and subjective reality; the *truth* existed independtly of the 3 men. Dick was correct and was in the possession of "objective truth"...

The actual position (or even removal) of the cash does not remove the feature of its identity that pertains to its location, it simply changes it. The location is based upon *where it actually is*, not where certain people *believe* (or *want*) it to be. Now, the producer could move it, but he is actually moving it; he is not capable of altering its properties without action to back up his desire to see its location be changed. So, if he moved it to curtain #1, Tom would in fact be the bearer of *truth*. If he removed it, *none* of the men could make such a claim, but that does not mean that it does not have an objective location.
posted by onceuponapriori at 2:49 م

 
"The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old
parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in
the whole volume of human nature by the hand of the divinity itself;
and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." --Alexander
Hamilton
posted by onceuponapriori at 11:23 ص